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Event: Rich Taylor, Former NSA Deputy Director for Operations, 1997-2001.

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Prepared by: Gordon Lederman

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Participants – non-Commission: Rich Taylor

Participants - Commission: Col. Lorry Fenner, Gordon Lederman

(U) BACKGROUND.

He graduated from the USAF Academy in 1969. He was the first person assigned directly to NSA after graduation from the Academy. He was a mathematician. He then worked in the NSOC forerunner (the Command Center) and subsequently developed the SOLIS (SIGINT On-Line Information System) for analysts and wrote software for processing ELINT. He then worked in the Director's Office with Bill Crowell on NSA outreach – hosting visitors and giving briefings. NSA was a leaner and flatter organization back then. Upon his fifth year at NSA, he had already stayed longer than hormally should have been able to do on his first assignment after graduation. Faced with the option of having to leave NSA, he resigned his commission and was hired as an NSA civilian. He became a program manager in the Research & Engineering (R&E) office and worked on modernization and signals processing and other matters. In 1976 he became Executive Secretary for the (under the SIGINT Advisory Panel), which examined how to focus NSA's potential – information and capabilities – on the most important contemporary questions and hardes problems. From 1977-1980, he worked in satellite operations – building for a larger capability and planning for implementation. He gained increasing responsibility through the 1980s. He served as Executive Assistant to the chief of A Group for a short time and then went back to R&E
chief of A Group for a short time and then went back to R&E
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In the summer
of 1990, he returned to NSA but without a specific job - he ended up as Chief of the
Office of Weapons, Space and Technology
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	He learned executive skills via this job. He was happy in this job, but in
•	December 1993 Bill Crowell (who had returned from retirement to become DDO) told
	him that DIRNSA Admiral McConnell needed him to head a program to create
	momentum in NSA for His reward for running this
	program was that he was appointed as Executive Director of NSA in March 1996 and
	served until the fall of 1997. Barbara McNamara was Deputy Director of NSA. General
	Minihan was DIRNSA then. Later Gen. Hayden became DIRNSA and he thought he'd
	move up to Deputy when McNamara left but Hayden hired Bill Black. Eventually Hayden advised him to move on and he resigned from NSA in February 2001. Taylor
	does have contractual relations with the IC through the company that he works for
1	and because he serves on several advisory boards for the DCI. He chairs <u>Charlie</u>
•	Allen's (ADCI/C) Advisory Board on Collection. He is a technical advisor to the
	and he advises the DCI on issues. He noted that he has more relations
	with CIA than with NSA even though he used to be an NSA employee.
	(U) RESOURCES AND TRANSFORMATION.
ı	NICA had taken stock of itself in 1002-1004 and had determined that technology
ı	NSA had taken stock of itself in 1993-1994 and had determined that technology and communications structural changes (including posed difficulties for
	NSA's mission but also opportunities. Although NSA was doing a lot of talking about
	these issues, not much was being done practically. They needed education and outsiders
	to help them. There were budget cuts starting in 1991, and the people who should have
	been proactive then in thinking about how NSA was going to handle budget cuts relative
	to also making changes didn't act quickly enough and therefore had to react when there
	were fewer resources to fight over. This reactive posture led to debates about apparent
	yet silly issues such as processing versus collection rather than focusing on how NSA
	could operate more holistically and gain better balance. When General Minihan started
	as DIRNSA, he said that NSA needed strategic focus and a plan regarding investment, and he reached back to work in NSA that had been done in 1992-1993 regarding NSA's
	future. He knew "we needed resources - someone to invest in us" and "we needed to
	communicate better with others." He knew NSA needed an integrated plan. Taylor
	advocated doing investment such that it did not divide NSA into rice bowls and
	encourage different managers to view their specific programs from an "ownership"
	perspective. Up until this time, Taylor had very positive experience in working
	collaboratively both within and outside NSA (with NRO, the Services, etc.) to get jobs
	done. He found a way not to be bothered internally in NSA. Yet as DDO he found that
	intellectual recognition of a problem is not sufficient – there must be an emotional
	commitment to solving the problem. The whole must be greater than the sum of the
	parts, and for this to happen people must feel like they own the "whole." Yet most of his
	peers only understood and were committed to their part and had a tendency to be
	fragmented. When McNamara moved on to be SUSLOL, he thought he would become
	Deputy Director but he did not. [William Black was brought in].

so they just got contributions/p strong internal the time that the "death" of NSA memorandum p who had budge the last year of responsibility.	e declines were a serious problem because NSA's posture had not changed a thinner. It was clear that people in the IC needed to leverage each others' artner more, and that included within NSA as well. NSA used to have processes, but NSA abandoned those processes in the early 1990s just at ose processes were needed the most in order to handle budget cuts. The A's program management occurred on August 19, 1991, when an NSA promulgated four rules for resource management, in sum that only a person at execution authority could make decisions about resource allocations in the program — rather than that being still the program managers. This memorandum codified precisely the wrong behavior. Program ld have continued to be responsible and accountable for their programs.
(U) TAYLOR	'S VISION AND START AS DDO.
New SIGINT I (although that spun-off activi	Ty 1998, when he was the DDO, he began "plotting" his strategy called the Enterprise for when he might eventually become Deputy DIRNSA never happened). The strategy reformed functions within the and ties that the was doing merely out of distrust that no one outside of the hem. He wanted to force others who were supposed to support the DDO.
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	9/11 Classified Information Taylor organized an off-site meeting with and key players
convinced Gen	NSA who were likely to be leaders in the next few years. Taylor also eral Minihan to have the NSA generally ea, but Gen. Minihan supported it and helped get DCI approval. Taylor
told	hat the NSA could be from only if sent to NSA someone
•	ed and had a realistic chance of having a key leadership position in
the future.	agreed. There were three areas that Taylor wanted the
work on seque	ntially and tried to pick one that had the expertise to do these. To normalize relations between NSA and and to start a dialogue
	between NSA representatives overseas and The
	first worked on this.
(2)	To work on He had been in a
	group that reset NSA's objectives in this area. The question was what to
/ / / /r	do about the future and NSA cooperation. He wanted the to
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	His second (now retired), worked on this issue.
/ / / (3)	He planned for his third to work on
-1/2 -1	He wanted the White House and DCI to pay attention to this.
	Also, NSA was less well-connected with the Secretary of Defense (when
	Bill Cohen became SecDef, NSA lost direct access to the SecDef). But
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	Taylor resigned before this person could be hired (he had a person in mind but declined to say who it was).
had been do found that b	r cited a test-case for CIA/NSA relations. There was something that NSA ing since NSA's creation. Taylor allowed CIA to become involved. Taylor oth CIA and NSA follow the same law but have different interpretations licies. The experiment was a disaster and showed ere issues that needed to be resolved in the arena before a lot more ared.
extended, Tadone. Gene he was goin like rolling	General Minihan found out that his tenure as DIRNSA was not being aylor found that General Minihan no longer had the energy to help get things ral Minihan essentially let down mentally in September 1998 since he knew g to be replaced soon. Unable to pursue issues that needed DIRNSA backing out the "New SIGINT Enterprise", Taylor concentrated on CIA/NSA cause he did not need DIRNSA to push for it.
(U) GENE	RAL HAYDEN'S TENURE AS DIRNSA.
his New SIG listing strate dinosaurs – disagree with and General organization the summer more DoD- hoping to be	ral Hayden arrived as DIRNSA in March 1999. He showed General Hayden GINT Enterprise strategy. He wrote a letter to General Hayden in March 1999 egic issues for NSA and stating that NSA had good people — not technological and that problems were systemic in nature. Since Gen. Hayden didn't overtly the him he thought they were in sync and began to execute his strategy. Yet he I Hayden were not on the same sheet of music regarding NSA's nal structure and future particularly in regard to the stuff." Only in of 2000 did Taylor realize this disparity. General Hayden wanted NSA to be centric, while Taylor wanted NSA to be more DCI-centric. Taylor was e appointed as McNamara's replacement as Deputy Director — he wasn't and retired in February 2001.
(U) 9-11.	
However, the problem reg	e are systemic problems. It took a long time to get into this situation. here are probably several smoking guns regarding 9-11. The key analytic garding an inquiry into 9-11 is that even if certain things were done differently, the actual attack itself would not necessarily have been prevented. Even if one a good job, other agencies could have messed up. No one individual is
his time at	he started as DDO, he received no specific direction from DIRNSA regarding orism. He said terrorism was per PDD-35 [it probably was actually No one questioned how important it was. As for DIRNSAs in general during NSA, they were not intelligence officers when they were DIRNSAs (except M McConnell). General Minihan did not enjoy doing estimates, and General d no interest from the beginning in working on them (coordinating on them).

The DDO ran intelligence operations and was the one involved in substantive intelligence issues. One of things Taylor wanted to do as DDO was align NSA with all of the directing documentation of the national security community, such as the DCI's strategic intent, Defense directives, and NSA's own directives and guidelines. The DCI updated the strategic intent annually. Taylor noted that his recollection of what he did as DDO is hindered by the fact that when he left NSA he left all of his notes and calendars at NSA which he believes have all been destroyed.
He was aware of the DCI's declaration of war in 1998. He recalled that the DCI came to NSA and made a speech in the NSA auditorium about it. The speech may have been videotaped. "You would have to have been in a coma" not knowing there was a declared war – but what actually happened in practice is a different story. The DCI came to NSA about twice per year when he was DDO.
(U) Collection.
He always viewed NSA and NIMA as in the "wholesale intelligence" business. NSA has so much impact on everyone's intelligence in the USG. NSA thus must try to maximize the total benefit for everyone. NSA's ideal is to have but only to collect and analyze what is needed. Today, the explosion of information means that selection, processing, and some exploitation to decide whether to continue with collection must be done as part of fine tuning collection itself. We need filtering and selection tools and they must be improved constantly. But these are not insurmountable. Limiting factors include the human factor, such as whether linguists are needed, and if the resource is "steerable" of whether it's a matter of "selection." The best elements of the workforce avoid lower priority issues and also issues in which there are conflicts in resources. Lower priorities naturally don't get enough manpower and resources to work them. Counterterrorism had all of the priority it needed from a collection perspective and got resources for production. However, we learned quickly that to be productive we needed linguists
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As the resource picture got worse and as
9/11 Classified Information Taylor found that a
better way was needed to allocate linguists across priorities. They needed a way to share their best people.
(U) ANALYSIS.
an the counterterrorism office when Taylor was DDO. There wa a lot of concern about terrorism due to the WTC 1993 attack, Bojinka, and upcoming Millennium (Taylor also mentioned to us: other bad things, Y2K, etc.). There was fear that there could be an attack domestically. Maureen Baginski ran

the reporting staff in the DO, with quality control and compliance issues. Taylor called
into his office and told him that his first priority to disseminate SIGINT
immediately to consumers, rather than to wait to complete a polished
report for dissemination. Taylor also told that first obligation was
to the "virtual community" of the IC that is concerned about taking action on terrorism
immediately.
He had a senior language advisor, In the summer of 1998, he told
her that NSA needed more linguists but there was no head room for new hires and he
asked her to develop a model of all languages to see where we stood regarding linguists,
what was happening regarding attrition rates for linguists, the graying of the work force,
what the effect of diminished hiring and
was, and what was the effect of the fact that conversations were much more
complicated now than they were when the was the target. He complained
to General Minihan and McNamara that more linguists and analysts were needed and
that, even if more linguists were provided immediately, it would to train them
and there would be a crisis in the interim period. He did not get relief. It was dangerous
for him to work Congress without approval of the seniors, but Congress tried to help.
Congress provided him with more linguist billets, but NSA undercut him by cutting his
linguist billets before he got the new ones so that Congress's additional billets would only
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(U) FOREIGN RELATIONS.
Taylor set up meetings of the GCHQ, and
NSA. They met twice per year in his office to "great effect". They agree to work
on key issues that had finite time horizons. GCHQ and NSA had very good
relations. relations were not always so good. The meetings were not continued
after Taylor ended his tenure as DDO. Current is not as interested in
them, and neither was the
At the last meeting, which Taylor arranged to have in GCHQ to honor GCHQ
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that were focused on specific issues, were limited, with measurable results,
and had ending times. In contrast, the would be open-ended and ongoing. And in general, Taylor had a more integrated view of intelligence than his colleagues. It
was easier to work issues with GCHQ.
issues with octio.
The 5 Eyes were different from They worked many issues together but
After WWII, there were conference held every 18 months between 5-eyes'
organizations. General Minihan was a renaissance man as leader of
NSA and saw that SIGINT and vice versa.
Minihan raised with the DCI the prospect of NSA being included in these meetings, and
the DCI agreed. General Hayden's first such conference was in the UK and was focused
on The US hosted the next conference in Scottsdale
Arizona in September 2000, called the "Rodeo conference."agencies of the 5-eyes
attended. Taylor had made notes for a speech to call for more integration of information
on In that speech, he said that we knew things but because of the lack of integration
we did not know that we knew them. Attendees at the conference included
DIRNSA and him. said that having increased
integration would waste resources and wouldn't pay off. The DCI and the DIRNSA said
nothing.
At the end of the day, there was no commitment to it.
thought it was too messy to share information with intelligence. On the
thought it was too mossy to share information with intemperiod. On the
airplane ride back to Washington, the DIRNSA told Taylor that the time had come for
airplane ride back to Washington, the DIRNSA told Taylor that the time had come for Taylor to move on.
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Taylor to move on. (U) LEGAL AUTHORITIES.
Taylor to move on. (U) LEGAL AUTHORITIES. His presentation at the conference was actually a follow-up to something Taylor
Taylor to move on. (U) LEGAL AUTHORITIES. His presentation at the conference was actually a follow-up to something Taylor did in 1999. When Hayden became DIRNSA, he encouraged him to pay a courtesy call

	that perhaps a new structural arrangement was needed in which the President would delegate Presidential authorities in toto to a lower-level official for a very narrow purpose. Taylor could only think of domestic counterterrorism as the best example. The suggestion went over like a lead balloon. However, Hayden saw this breakfast as a getto-know-you rather than to work on substantive issues and did not support Taylor.
·	He sharply criticized FBI Director Freeh for not doing more on counterterrorism. Someone has to be a leader and invest him/herself in the issue and motivate others. This leadership was lacking.
	NSA's relationship with DEA was idyllic from one perspective but a ball & chain in another. NSA would get information but not report on it because it concerned US Persons and criminal activity rather than foreign intelligence (USSID 18). He noted that in general it takes a long time for the USG to do anything or solve a problem. He believes intelligence in general, and NSA in particular, should be on a short leash regarding privacy and civil liberties. But he worked out procedures with DEA such that NSA would notify DEA (without content information) if NSA received information concerning [Suspicion that they were related to the for which they not only had permission but a requirement to report it), DEA would make an official request (formatted STU III fax) for that
	information (and the burden on them was would provide the information – they were prepositioned to respond with the appropriate information immediately to support action. Only certain people in the DEA and FBI could have access to that information
	The DoJ had to approve this arrangement and it went through all the lawyers. It was a big burden on him (at all times and had to be in constant contact). Yet the DDO has the duty to provide lead information concerning to law enforcement, and that is what these procedures were designed to do. He set up a special oversight body in Baginski's reporting shop to conduct oversight of NSA's effort – it could not be done by the shop because they had been taught to avoid even coming close to a USSID 18 violation ("the wall") – to make sure that they were performing legally. He noted as an aside that oversight of his activities was done by NSA, the DCI,
	SECDEF, Congress, and the White House. The FBI was interested in some of NSA's but not others. DEA has lots of problems, including dirty people, but one impressive thing DEA did was to create a wall between intelligence and law enforcement and between leads and investigative material, and these walls were never penetrated. In contrast, the FBI allowed penetration of these walls all of the time.
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	Of course the attorneys would want the information
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if they knew it was there. Yet leaks are part of doing the intelligence business (not Taylor's words). Intelligence does no good if it cannot be used. The question is how it should be used and how do you decide what is important enough to use. Do you solve one problem and thereby let 100 others go? The prosecutors do not think about the longer term issues. The DCI should have a voice in the decision – it should not be the investigative team that decides whether intelligence should be used. Yet these are systemic problems – he had great relations with FBI on a personal level.
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sources – but what is important is what you do with a source, not that you have a source. Since NSA's creation, there are dozens of examples of leaks that possibly compromised the source. It's common so you have to work through it.
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There is a fundamental conflict between
access and use.
(U) WARNING AND LEGAL ISSUES.
With respect to building an I&W capability, it needed to be built off of a different platform.
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When NSA's A (USSR) Group was dismantled, the rest of NSA was happy to see it expire because of jealousy surrounding A Group's advantage in resources. However, the loss of A Group led to a loss of the I&W methodology – they were good at structural things - that A Group had developed. No one thought that they could learn from A Group's methodologies. And due to resource cuts at critical times the developmental activities to build this capability back in NSA was lacking. It is harder to build these capabilities when there is nothing to "surround and watch" We swim in the same sea as the terrorists.
And the problems are not just conceptual and technical but also legal. There needs to be a high-level legal authorities conference involving the White House, NSC, DCI, SECDEF, DHS, DOJ, etc. to resolve legal issues, but that conference has not occurred. He had very bad relations with the NSA-GC. He always had to obey the law but he wanted to rub his cheek up against the membrane of the law's edge but not penetrate it. The NSA-GC had a different conception. Taylor did not want the NSA-GC to judge operations but rather to facilitate/design operations that would be legal. Yet because NSA had gotten into so much trouble in the 1970s, and so many people at NSA were

defending based on caselaw (it's just different policy articulations), as there is in fact no				
caselaw because NSA has assiduously	avoided going to court to create any caselaw. You			
can change policy, not the law. 9/11 Classified Information	He wants policy change but does not			
advocate changing the law.				
In response to a question from Col. Fenner, he clarified his statement in his Joint Inquiry interview about the time that he called the DCI and DDCI with some hot information. He said that the DCI would call him directly when he wanted something, and he could call them directly 9/11 Classified Information In 1999, there was "lots of stuff flying around" and				
there were concerns about terrorism on	the Millenium, there was Ressam and use of			
airplanes. Many people were very wor	rried, and lots of scenarios were devised.			
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the lack of conadoration	which prevented correlation (especially between the FBI and	
NSA).	which prevented correlation (especially between the 1 b) and	
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has been weakens	ad due to the 1001 memor	Taylor responded that pro	ogram lier.
management has been weakened due to the 1991 memorandum he mentioned earlier. Only the execution authority could spend money in the last year of a program rather than a program manager. As an aside, he said that Congress beats you up for one priority, and then you fix it and they criticize you for something else.			
	9/11 Classified Informati	He does	
recall whether meeting. His enforcer as DDO but she was of course not family Baginski generally cleaned up legal compliance authority). At to jail.	was Baginski, so she m liar with every report pro messes and enforced star	oduced by the DDO at the ndards for reporting (and v	on KL time – was the

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	9/11 Classified Information
Į	given to the HPSCI. Ultimately the matter was squelched. Everyone did everything with the best of intentions.
	(U) INFORMATION SHARING AND MANAGEMENT.
, o a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	Asked about the FBI liaison to NSA, this person had multiple missions. He helped tailor requirements and contacted the Product Lines directly if he needed reports or information. He also was integrated into their operations. When asked who he reports to, Taylor said it's an ambiguous position. He is the "NSA Director's representative to FBI" but is part of the DDO staff. He remembered It was and then NSA had people integrated in other organizations pre-911 – these integrees are there to facilitate the flow of SIGINT to customers and to ensure that customer requests are expressed in a manner intelligible to NSA. NSA is the most forward-leaning regarding collaboration. Not many others send representatives to NSA.
	"NSA always shared raw data when it needed to."
	But people would ask NSA for raw material when if they received it, it would drown them. Sometimes when they actually see what they think they want they realize they don't really want it. In general, part of the reason information is not shared in the IC is possessive and "shameful human nature." But even if there is a bias in favor of sharing, information-sharing is extremely complex. Also, we need to ensure that two different interpretations of the Attorney General's guidelines are not mixed in the same database. It is up to the leaders to work out information-sharing and it needs constant attention.
	U.S. intelligence needs to be rewired to some extent. Maybe we need to redraw boundaries in the IC. However, the problem is not an organizational one. We need a vision for how U.S. intelligence should operate. The whole intelligence system has problems. If you merely reorganize, you are just dressing old problems in new clothing. We need to understand how things should be done before the pacifier of reorganization is used. Reorganizations have not fixed problems in the past. A sweeping reorganization would sap energy in the IC away from critical work. In fact, the day after he left NSA as DDO, the DO was totally reorganized [into SID]. In his view, NSA would have been in disarray on 9/11 due to the reorganization.
ı	His Rodeo conference notes were destroyed by NSA. There are probably some document floating around.
	He cautioned us against trying to determine
	whether his vision of NSA would have been a better vision.

On 911, he was writing a report that he had been hired to do on recurring issues in the IC. His team included and Mark Lowenthal (before the latter became
ADCI/A&P). He wanted the report to be hard-hitting. It was entitled Recurring Themes
It was not just about CT.
Regarding the conference on legal issues that he proposed, people at NSA were worried that if the conference was held, NSA might lose some of its authorities. He strongly disagreed – he said that the times we live in would mean that NSA would not lose authorities, and NSA needed to have clarity in the authorities in order to enable NSA to function